





The tenth variation of Bach’s Goldberg Variations is a short four-voice fugue.  It 
begins with a subject in the bass (on G below middle C) which is answered after four 
bars in the tenor; the soprano voice begins after a further four bars, and the final alto 
voice begins four bars later.  When played at a normal tempo one doesn’t hear the 
variation as a sequence of notes in the order in which they are played.  As each new 
voice begins its notes are heard as a distinct melody – a separate voice parallel to the 
other voices – so that after twelve bars one hears four parallel melodies playing 
simultaneously.  It is possible to attend selectively to each melody, but difficult to 
attend to more than one simultaneously; instead, when one attends to one melody it is 
heard against a background of the others.  Although one can hear the order of and 
temporal relations between the notes that make up each melody, it is impossible to 
hear the order of the notes that make up the variation as a whole, and impossible to 
hear the temporal relations between the notes as they are actually played.1 
This is an example of auditory grouping.  We experience a sequence of notes 
as a number of separate groups or streams each of which is made up of only some 
notes in the sequence.  This kind of grouping is central to our experience of many 
kinds of music, but grouping in music is the result of a process that occurs in, and is 
essential to, auditory perception generally – or so, at least, I shall argue. 
 
I. Which objects are auditory objects? 
 
Sounds are those objects of experience that can be characterised in terms of their 
loudness, pitch, and timbre.  We can regard any sound as an auditory object, but I am 
going to use the term ‘auditory object’ to mean those temporally extended sequences 
of sounds that are experienced as a group in the way that we experience the notes of 
each melody as grouped.  These sequences may or may not be composed of discrete, 
countable, sounds; in what follows I will talk of parts of a sequence and mean either 
the discrete sounds of a sequence or simply the temporal parts of a sequence that are 
                                                 
1It is impossible, at least, for someone who is not already familiar with the musical score, i.e. with the 
order in which the notes are played. 
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not experienced as discrete.2  By reserving my use of the term ‘auditory object’ for 
sequences of sounds experienced as a group I don’t mean to imply that there is some 
fundamental difference between auditory objects and other sounds.  There is not.  It is 
simply that the issues that I want to discuss arise most clearly for grouped sequences 
of sounds. 
When we experience two or more sequences simultaneously (as we do with 
Bach’s Goldberg Variation) we experience parts of each sequence belonging with 
other parts of the same sequence, but as not belonging with parts of the other 
sequence.  That parts are grouped together has consequences for our perceptual 
experience.  Many of the properties and features awareness of which constitute our 
auditory experience are properties or features of groups of sounds.  For example, we 
experience melodic, rhythmic, or other patterns amongst parts of a grouped sequence, 
but not amongst parts that belong to different groups; we can often tell the order of 
parts in a grouped sequence, but not the order of parts that belong to different groups;3 
and we can attend to one group to the exclusion of another, but not to two or more 
different groups simultaneously, nor can we simultaneously attend to two or more 
parts that belong to different groups.  What I am calling auditory objects are those 
sounds which are experienced as grouped and so as having properties of this kind.  It 
is these objects – objects that we can pick out in our auditory experience – that I am 
going discuss in this paper. 
Not all sequences of sounds are auditory objects (as I am using the term) 
because not all sequences of sounds are experienced as a group.  When we experience 
a sequence as a group we experience the different parts of the sequence as belonging 
together.  When the parts of the sequence are not discrete parts we experience the 
sequence as a single, continuous, sound; when the parts of the sequence are discrete 
our experience still seems to be of a single thing – a single auditory object – but our 
experience is discontinuous: we experience individual sounds as parts of a single 
auditory object, our experience of which is seems somehow interrupted.  The 
experience of hearing such an auditory object is analogous to the experience of seeing 
an object through the railings of a fence: the parts of the object we see through the 
                                                 
2 There is no sharp boundary between the two kinds of sequence.  Although different questions arise for 
each, as far as the issues that I discuss in this paper are concerned the differences don’t matter. 
3 It’s not always possible for listeners to perceive the order of elements in a group, but listeners can 
discriminate groups composed of different orderings of the same elements: the order of elements in a 
group determine how that group sounds; elements in other groups don’t. 
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gaps in the fence look to be parts of a single object of which we have an interrupted 
view.4  The analogy might strike you as a poor one.  After all, in the visual case there 
is a single object we see, and we see the fence that interrupts our view of it, whereas 
in the auditory case the sounds we hear are in fact discontinuous, and we are not 
aware of anything interrupting our hearing them.  But the problem in both cases is the 
same: it is the problem of explaining what it is to experience parts of what appears to 
be a single object – be it a visual or an auditory object – as belonging together as parts 
of that object.  In the case of vision the problem is tractable: the parts are parts of a 
material object, so the problem is that of explaining what it is to see parts as parts of a 
material object.  In the auditory case, things are not so straightforward.  The parts are 
parts of an auditory object, but if an auditory object just is what we experience when 
we experience sounds as a group then it’s not clear how we can explain what it is to 
experience sounds as a group in terms of hearing them to be parts of, or as belonging 
to, a single auditory object.  A satisfactory explanation of what it is to hear sounds as 
parts of a single auditory object must do two things.  First, it must give some account 
of what our experience of auditory objects is an experience of – it must tell us what 
auditory objects are ‘in the world’ independently of our experience of them – and 
second, it must give an account of the content of our experience of auditory objects – 
it must, that is, explain what it is to experience a sequence of sounds as parts of a 
single auditory object.  These two questions are related, but an answer to one is not an 
answer to the other.5 
                                                 
4 The auditory grouping that I discuss in this paper should be distinguished from auditory perceptual 
restoration effects such as the continuity illusion (for a description of such effects and the 
circumstances in which they occur, see Warren (1999, ch.6)).  Perceptual restoration effects concern 
the perception of auditory stimuli – what we might loosely call the sound itself – whereas auditory 
grouping concerns the perception of the source of the sound.  Auditory grouping is therefore analogous 
to the visual perception of occluded surfaces and objects, whereas auditory perceptual restoration is 
not. 
5 There is a parallel here to the account we should give of the visual perception of causation.  People 
can visually discriminate objects that appear causally related from objects that do not appear causally 
related.  In order to determine the circumstances in which objects appear to be causally related, 
Michotte (1963) conducted a series of experiments in which subjects were shown the interactions of 
pairs of objects.  He discovered that if subjects saw, for example, a moving object X collide with a 
stationary object Y which then started to move, they had the impression that X caused Y to move; if, 
however, there was a delay before object Y started to move, subjects no longer had the impression that 
X caused Y to move.  Subjects had impressions of causation even when these ‘objects’ were patches of 
light projected on a screen.  We can ask two questions about the subjects’ visual experience in such 
cases.  First, what relation ‘in the world’ is their experience of causation tracking, what is it an 
experience of?  Second, does their visual experience represent the relation between objects as one of 
causation?  Even if their experience of causation tracks causation in the world, it wouldn’t follow that 
they experience it as such; and even if their experience represents causation, it wouldn’t follow that 




II. Why do we experience auditory objects? 
 
It is sometimes suggested that we can explain what it is to hear sounds as parts of a 
single auditory object by appealing to principles of auditory experience analogous to 
Gestalt principles in vision.6  To do so is to explain auditory objects in a purely 
auditory way, where an explanation of auditory objects is purely auditory if it explains 
them only in terms of the auditory or sensory properties of sounds.  The following 
examples illustrate this kind of explanation. 
Auditory grouping can occur with simple sequences of tones.  When listeners 
are played a sequence of six tones – three from a high-pitch range and three from a 
low pitch range – what they hear depends on the rate at which the tones are played.  
When they are played slowly listeners hear the tones in the order in which they are 
played; when they are played fast (at a rate of ten per second) they hear two parallel 
sequences, one of repeating low pitch tones and the other of repeating high pitch 
tones.7  When listeners are played a sequence of tones that alternates between a rising 
a falling trajectory they do not hear the sequence as two linear trajectories that cross at 
the midpoint; they hear the tones as grouped into two sequences made up of the higher 
pitch and the lower pitch tones.  However, if the tones that make up the rising 
trajectory are given a different timbre from those that make up the falling trajectory, 
two crossing sequences are heard. 
In these two examples, sounds are experienced as organised into two groups 
and the groups are heard as distinct.  Each sound is experienced as belonging to one 
group but not the other.  What explains why the sounds are experienced as grouped in 
the way they are?  Altering the properties of the sounds, or the speed at which they are 
played, changes the way they are grouped; it might seem, therefore, that grouping is 
determined by properties of the sounds. For example, sounds that are similar and 
temporally proximal tend to be experienced as grouped together; there are different 
dimensions of similarity, and sounds may be similar in virtue of their pitch or in virtue 
of their timbre with – as the second example demonstrates – timbre contributing more 
to similarity than pitch.  So it might seem that we can give an account of auditory 
                                                                                                                                            
 
6 For example, Bregman (1990, ch.2); Deutsch (1999). 




objects in a purely auditory way, in terms of properties of sounds and the relations 
between sounds.  According to this account, auditory objects are sequences of sounds 
that are related to one another in various ways – that have a similar pitch, are 
temporally proximate, and so on – and our experience of an auditory object just is an 
experience that represents a number of sounds as having these properties and standing 
in these relations to each other. 
 
III. What’s wrong with purely auditory explanations? 
 
When we experience a sequence of sounds as grouped each sound is experienced as 
belonging together with other sounds – as being parts of a single auditory object.  
What explanation can the purely auditory account give of what it to experience sounds 
as belonging together as parts of a single auditory object? 
The explanation cannot just be that to experience a sequence of sounds as 
grouped is to experience a sequence of sounds that satisfy the principles of grouping – 
a sequence of sounds that, say, have the same timbre.  To say that is just to say that 
we experience each sound of the sequence as having a timbre which is the same as the 
others.  That adds nothing to the description of the content of the experience, and so it 
doesn’t explain what it is to experience them as grouped.  A defender of the pure 
auditory account might claim that we don’t just experience sounds as having the 
properties in virtue of which they satisfy the principles of grouping, but that we 
experience them as satisfying those principles: that we experience sounds with the 
same timbre as having the same timbre.  To experience an auditory object, according 
to this suggestion, is to experience a sequence of sounds as having the same timbre 
(or as being related along some other relevant dimension of similarity). 
An initial problem with this suggestion is that it’s not clear what it means to 
say that we experience a sequence of sounds as similar to each other if that doesn’t 
simply mean that we experience them as having the properties in virtue of which they 
are similar.  But, for the sake of argument, suppose that some explanation of that is 
possible.  The resulting account still does little more than describe the phenomenon 
we wanted to explain: it does little more than point out that auditory objects are 
composed of sounds that are, in certain ways described by the principles of grouping, 
similar to each other, and that we experience them as such.  It doesn’t tell us what it is 
in general to experience a sound as part of an auditory object.  In each case, the pure 
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auditory account can point to some dimension (or dimensions) of similarity – 
sameness of timbre, similarity of pitch, temporal proximity, and so on – that we 
experience the sounds as having to each other, but it doesn’t explain what is common 
to all these different particular explanations.  For example, in one case we might 
experience a sound as part of an auditory object in virtue of experience is as having 
the same timbre as those other sounds; in another case we might experience a sound 
as part of an auditory object in virtue of being harmonically related; the explanation is 
different in each case; we have no explanation, therefore, of what it is in general to 
experience a sound as part of an auditory object. 
The problem is that the purely auditory account does not explain why we 
experience as grouped sounds that satisfy the principles of grouping – it doesn’t 
explain why those principles of grouping are true and not others.  The principles tell 
us in what circumstances we experience sounds as grouped, but not why we 
experience sounds as grouped in those circumstances.  They do not, therefore, provide 
a satisfying explanation of our experience of auditory objects.  In what follows I 
explain why we experience sounds as grouped in just those circumstances described 
by the principles of grouping, and I use that explanation to provide an account both of 
what auditory objects are, and of what we experience them as being.   
We experience sounds as grouped – and so experience auditory objects – as a 
consequence of the way the auditory system functions; so to understand why we 
experience sounds as grouped in the circumstances described by the principles of 
grouping we need to understand how auditory perception functions.   
 
IV. Auditory Function 
 
What is the function of auditory perception?  Auditory perception, like vision, 
functions to tell us about objects in our environment; it does so by detecting 
disturbances in the air produced by those objects, and by events involving them.  
Although it is perhaps obvious that vision functions to tell us about objects, that 
auditory perception does so too is not obvious.  I shall begin by outlining an account 
of auditory function that justifies that claim (by showing how it can have that 
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function), and then go on to say something about the consequences it’s having that 
function has for an account of auditory objects.8 
It is often assumed that the purpose or function of auditory perception is to tell 
us about sounds.  Although auditory perception does tell us about sounds, that is not 
its function.  Imagine that you are woken up in the middle of the night by a strange 
sound.  As you lie there, listening, you can attend to your experience in two ways: you 
might attend to the sound itself, focussing on its attributes – its pitch, timbre, and 
loudness – but it is more likely that you will attend to what is making the sound: that 
it is the sound of footsteps, that it is coming from the stairwell, and that they seem to 
be coming closer.  When people are asked to describe what they hear (in 
psychoacoustics experiments, for example) they are often encouraged to attend to 
their experience in the first way: to describe the sensory attributes of the sounds they 
hear in abstraction from whatever it was that produced the sounds.9  They may be 
helped by being played harmonically simple sounds produced by a tone generator, 
sounds which develop little over time and which have little or no ecological 
significance.  There is little to describe about such an experience over and above the 
sensory qualities of the sounds.  The majority of the sounds we hear are not like that, 
and most everyday listening is of the second kind: we attend to the apparent sources 
of the sounds we hear and listen to the things going on around us: to the objects and 
events that produced the sounds.  In most everyday listening we are concerned with 
properties and attributes of the sound producing events and objects, and with the 
environment in which they occur, and not with properties of the sound itself.10   
Although relatively little investigation has been done to determine how good 
we are at perceiving and recognising sound sources, that which has been done has 
found that we are (perhaps surprisingly) good at both.  There is evidence that we are 
capable of recognising very specific characteristics of the events and objects we 
                                                 
8 The account is this section draws on the more detailed discussion and defence given in Nudds 
(forthcoming). 
9 When they do this, listeners adopt what Gaver (1993) calls a ‘musical’ and Scruton (1987, pp.2 ff.) an 
‘acousmatic’ attitude to what they hear. 
10 In what follows I am going to talk about the perception of what may be labelled ‘ecological’ sounds 
and their sources – those sounds produced by naturally occurring events or various kinds (and 
excluding sounds produced by musical instruments and recorded sounds).  Ecological sounds 
themselves, rather than their sources, are not very interesting or informative; indeed for many 
ecological sounds it is actually rather difficult to attend to the sound rather than to the source of the 
sound and we are poor at describing the character of the sound.  It is easy to overlook the nature of 
ecological sound perception because we have become so used to hearing artificially produced sounds. 
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hear.11  We are, for example, very good at recognising what kind of object or event 
produced a sound.  Listeners who were played recordings of different size jars and 
bottles falling to the ground and either bouncing or breaking and were asked which 
kind of event – a bouncing or a breaking – they heard were almost always correct.12  
When asked to identify thirty common natural sounds in a free identification task – 
sounds such as those produced by clapping, tearing paper, and footsteps – listeners 
recognised source events very reliably; they described the sounds in terms of the 
objects and events which caused them, and only described the sensory qualities of 
sounds whose source events they could not recognise.13  In a similar experiment in 
which seventeen sounds were played, listeners were asked to identify what they heard.  
They nearly always described the sounds in terms of their sources, and were 
surprisingly accurate.  Several participants could readily distinguish the sounds made 
by someone running upstairs from those of someone running downstairs; others were 
correct about the size of objects dropped into water; and most could tell from the 
sound of pouring liquid that a cup was being filled.  Some sounds – such as the sound 
of a file drawer being opened and closed – were difficult to identify, but the listeners’ 
descriptions revealed what might be regarded as basic attributes of what was heard: 
“several people said the file drawer sounded like a bowling alley, both of which might 
be described as ‘rolling followed by impact(s)’”.14  Further investigation is likely to 
reveal many more examples. 
As well as recognising the sources of sounds we can perceive their properties.  
We are, for example, able to perceive the trajectory of an approaching sound source,15 
and the time to contact – that is, the time at which we will collide – with a sound 
source that is moving towards us.16  We are good at hearing whether an invisible 
                                                 
11 For a recent survey of much of this evidence, see Carello et al. (2005).  Compare what I describe here 
to accounts of visual object recognition, which has been studied in great detail and is widely 
understood to be a perceptual phenomenon with the results of the process of object recognition entering 
into the content of visual experience.  I know of few equivalent studies of object recognition in auditory 
perception, but see McAdams (1993) and Peretz (1993). 
12 Listeners’ success rate was 99%; see Warren and Verbrugge (1984). 
13 The success rate was about 95%; see VanDerveer (1979). 
14 Gaver (1993a, p.12).  It is plausible to suppose that recognising such events involves the perception 
of simpler, more fundamental, properties of events and that such properties may be perceived even 
when the event is not recognised.  In much the same way visual recognition of an object as, for 
example, a television, involves perceiving the object as having more fundamental properties such as 
size and shape which it may be perceived as having even when it is not recognised as a television. 
15 Neuhoff (2004). 
16 Schiff and Oldak (1990). 
9 
 
object making a noise is within reach;17 and we are able to hear just as well as we can 
see whether a gap between a sound source and a vertical surface is wide enough to 
pass through.18  We can identify the material composition of an object from the sound 
of an impact,19 and perceive the force of the impact.20  More surprisingly, perhaps, we 
are able to distinguish objects on the basis of their geometrical properties.  When 
differently shaped – circular, square, and triangular – flat steel plates of the same mass 
and surface area were suspended and struck by a steel pendulum released from a fixed 
location, listeners sitting behind a screen were able to classify the shapes at a level 
well above chance.  A similar experiment was conducted with rectangular steel plates 
of different proportions and dimensions chosen so that all were equal in mass and 
surface area.  Listeners had to respond by adjusting lines to provide a visual match for 
the height and width of the plate.  Although they were given no other information 
about the size of the object, the actual linear dimensions of the plates accounted for 
98% of the variance in the listeners’ responses.21  Similarly, when listeners were 
asked to indicate the lengths of cylindrical rods dropped to the floor, the actual length 
of the rods accounted for 95% of the variance in perceived length.22 
Given that we can perceive and recognise the sources of the sounds we hear, it 
is plausible that auditory perception functions to tell us about those sources, and that 
in addition to representing sounds, our auditory experience represents the sources of 
sounds and their properties.  For such a suggestion to be plausible, we need to explain 
how auditory perception could have this function.  We should begin with how sound 
sources produce sounds.  Sounds can be produced by many different kinds of things – 
liquids, solid objects, strings, air movement – and in many different ways, but for 
simplicity I am going to consider only material objects.  Material objects produce 
sounds when they are struck, tapped, scraped, broken or otherwise caused to vibrate. 
We often picture a vibration as a single sine wave.  Not even something as 
simple as a plucked string vibrates in such a simple way.  The vibration of a plucked 
                                                 
17 Carello et al. (1998). 
18 Russell and Turvey (1999). 
19 Wildes and Richards (1988). 
20 Freed (1990). 
21 The plates were a square (482mm), a medium rectangle (381mm x 610mm), and a long rectangle 
(254mm x 914mm), the width indicator ranged from 0 to 2.5m, and the height indicator from 0 to 1.5m. 
Although listeners’ relative scaling of the plates was accurate, the perceived dimensions were 
underestimates of actual dimensions, ranging from 252mm to 445mm for an actual range of 254mm to 
914mm  (Kunkler-Peck and Turvey 2000).   
22 Carello, et al. (1998). 
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string is complex; it comprises a number of simple vibrations at frequencies which are 
integer multiples of the lowest, or fundamental, frequency of the vibration.23  Any 
complex vibration is equivalent to a number of simple frequency components 
superimposed on each other; that means we can represent any complex vibration as a 
pattern of individual frequency components.  Objects vibrate along a greater number 
of dimensions than strings and consequently their vibrations are more complex and so 
composed of a greater number of frequency components.  What’s important for our 
understanding of auditory perception is that the particular pattern of frequency 
components produced by a material object when it vibrates is determined in a law-like 
way by both the physical nature of the object and the nature of the event that caused it 
to vibrate.  For example, the shape and size of the object determine the lowest 
frequency of its vibration and what harmonics are present.  The overall amplitude of 
the vibration is determined by the force that initially deforms the object, but because 
objects are not linearly elastic the amplitude of individual frequency components 
varies with the force of the initial deformation.  The spectral composition of the 
vibration therefore changes according to how hard the object was struck.24  Vibrating 
objects lose energy over time and their vibration decays.  The rate of decay of 
different frequencies components – and so changes in the spectral composition of the 
vibration over time – is determined by the material of which the object is composed. 
The pattern of frequency components that comprise the vibration of an object 
and the way that pattern changes over time is determined by the nature of the object 
and the nature of the events that caused it to vibrate.  That pattern and the way it 
changes therefore embody information about the object that produced the vibration 
and the event that caused it to vibrate.  The vibrations of objects produce compression 
waves in the surrounding air.  In an enclosed space, the compression waves will 
reflect off surfaces and objects, and the waves produced by different objects will 
interact with each other to alter the spectral composition of the wave in determinate 
ways, with the result that the local disturbance of the air at any place will carry 
information about any number of objects and events, and about the environment in 
which they occur.  This local disturbance of the air is what is detected by our ears. 
                                                 
23 The vibration of a plucked string is actually made up of the odd harmonics of the fundamental unlike 
the vibration of a string excited in some other way, which includes both odd and even harmonics. 
24 It is in virtue of this that we can distinguish the intensity of a sound (its loudness) from the apparent 
force of the impact that produced the sound. 
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The auditory system detects the frequency components that make up the 
complex vibrations of the soundwave that reaches the ears.  To tell us about the 
sources of sounds it must construct a representation of objects producing sounds by 
extracting the information about them embodied in the pattern of frequency 
components detected by the ears.   
If the sounds we heard were only ever produced by one object at a time the 
fact that a soundwave is made up of many frequency components would be 
unproblematic: components that are detected simultaneously would have been 
simultaneously produced by a single event, and successively detected components 
would have been produced by temporally successive parts of that event.  Often, 
however, there are many different objects producing sounds simultaneously, so the 
compression wave that is detected by the ears is, at any moment, the result of the 
additive combination of the compression waves produced by all the sound producing 
events occurring in our immediate environment; as a result this compression wave is 
composed of frequency components produced by different objects.   
Auditory perception therefore requires perceptual processing much like that 
involved in visual perception.  We can think of the frequency components detected by 
the ears as analogous to the pattern of light detected by the retinas of the eyes.  Just as 
we see things in virtue of detecting a pattern of light on a surface (the retina), so we 
hear things in virtue of detecting properties of soundwaves disturbing a surface (the 
basilar membrane).  We don’t, of course, see the pattern of light: our visual 
experience is the result of perceptual processes to which the pattern of light detected 
by the retina is one of the inputs.  Similarly, we don’t hear the frequency components 
of soundwaves detected by the ears; our auditory experience, including the sounds we 
hear, is a result of perceptual processes, to which the frequency components of 
soundwaves are one of the inputs.  This perceptual process involves at least the 
following three stages. 
The first stage is sensory transduction or detection: the ears detect properties 
of the soundwave – the local disturbance of the air.  The result of this sensory 
transduction is, in effect, a temporal spectrogram of the soundwave which encodes the 
frequency and temporal properties of the soundwave’s vibration.  The ears detect each 
of the frequency components (within a detectable range) present in the soundwave’s 
vibration.   
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The second stage involves grouping together the frequency components that 
have been produced by the same source.25  Information about objects and events is 
embodied in the relationships amongst the frequency components produced by an 
object’s vibration and the way those frequency components change over time.  In 
order both to determine how many objects are producing sounds at any time and to 
extract information about those objects the auditory system must organise frequency 
components into groups corresponding to the objects that produced them.  Frequency 
components need to be grouped so that all the frequency components produced by a 
single source are treated together, and those from different sources treated as distinct 
by subsequent processes.  There are two kinds of grouping.   
Firstly, frequency components produced at a time must be grouped together as 
having been produced simultaneously by a source;26 secondly, simultaneous groups 
must be sequentially grouped over time as having been produced by a temporally 
extended event involving a single object, and series of such sequences grouped as 
having been produced by a series of events involving a single object.  In order, for 
example, for the auditory system to determine how many objects are producing 
sounds at any time, it must group the frequency components it detects at a time 
according to the object that produced them.  If the auditory system detects sequences 
of frequency components then grouping them together as having been produced by a 
single object allows information about that object to be recovered: information about 
how the object is changing or moving, for example; and it allows events to be 
recognised.  In order to recognise an object as dropped onto a hard surface and 
bouncing the auditory system must group the sequences of frequency components 
produced by the object as having been produced by a single object; similarly, in order 
to recognise water filling a glass we must experience a single continuous sound – the 
auditory system must group earlier and later frequency components as parts of the 
same group – as produced by an ongoing process.  In both cases, in order to perceive 
                                                 
25 What follows draws on psychological accounts of auditory scene analysis, especially the work of 
Bregman (1990).  Bregman’s account explains why we experience a segregated auditory ‘scene’ of 
distinct sounds, and he shows how the auditory system organises frequency components in ways that in 
fact correspond to the events that produced them.  He does not, however, discuss the auditory 
perception of the objects that are the sources of sounds, and doesn’t draw the conclusion that auditory 
perception is object perception rather than (simply) sound perception. 
26 In what follows, when I talk of simultaneous grouping I mean grouping of components that were 
produced simultaneously; I am not implying that the process of grouping is simultaneous. 
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the sources of sounds and their properties the auditory system must simultaneously 
and sequentially group the frequency components produced by that source. 
How does the auditory system determine which frequency components to 
group together?  In the case of simultaneous grouping, there are relationships that 
exist between components produced by the same source that are unlikely to exist 
between components produced by different sources.  For example, an object’s 
vibration often has frequency components that are harmonics of a fundamental 
frequency and so the frequency components of a soundwave that are produced by the 
same source will often be harmonically related.  Such harmonic relationships are 
unlikely to exist between frequency components produced by distinct sources since it 
is unlikely that two simultaneously occurring natural events produce overlapping sets 
of harmonics.  This means that if the auditory system detects a number of frequency 
components that are harmonically related then they are likely to have been produced 
by the same source.  Similarly, the soundwave produced by a single event will have 
frequency components that share temporal properties – all the components will begin 
at the same time – are likely to be in phase with one another, and are likely to change 
over time in both amplitude and frequency in similar ways.  Components produced by 
distinct sources are very unlikely to be related to each other in these ways.  When the 
auditory system detects these relationships between components it groups them 
together and treats them as having been produced by the same source.  Components 
that are not related in this way are not grouped together.   
Just as for simultaneous grouping, there are relationships between frequency 
components produced by the same source at different times that are unlikely to exist 
between components that are produced by different sources.  For example, sets of 
components with the same spectral composition at different times are unlikely to have 
been produced by different sources.  Sources can change in size and so the frequency 
components they produce can shift in frequency.  When this happens the overall 
pattern of frequencies is likely to remain the same.  If the auditory system detects 
frequency modulated sets of components with the same spectral composition then 
they are likely to have been produced by an object that is changing.  Objects cannot 
change instantaneously, so if successive frequency components differ greatly in 
frequency they are likely to have been produced by distinct sources.  If two identical 
sets of components separated by a gap are detected, then it is more likely that they are 
produced by a single object than by two different objects.  These examples are of 
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bottom-up or stimulus driven grouping.  It is likely that some grouping of sequences 
of components is top-down.  That is, some sequences are grouped because they fit 
into a perceptual pattern that the auditory system recognises as likely to have been 
produced by a certain kind of source.27  Grouping sequences of familiar sounds 
produced by machines is likely to be the result of such top-down grouping. 
In general the auditory system makes best sense of the frequency components 
it detects, where making best sense of frequency components means grouping them – 
both simultaneously and sequentially – in such a way that they correspond to the 
sources that would best explain their occurrence.  It is an important consequence of 
this that we cannot explain why the auditory system groups the frequency components 
that it detects in the way it does other than in terms of a process that functions to 
extract information about the objects that produced those frequency components.  
This is true of both simultaneous and sequential grouping.  The auditory system 
groups together all and only frequency components that are likely to have been 
produced by the same source. 
The third stage of processing involves extracting information from the 
frequency component groupings.28  The grouping process results in sets of frequency 
components that are treated by subsequent processes as having been produced by a 
single source.  These sets of components carry information about those sources, and 
the fact that we can perceive various properties of the sources of sounds means that 
the auditory system must extract that information.  Exactly what information is 
extracted and how it is extracted is still, for the most part, unclear.  We can perceive 
how many sources there are, and often where they are; we can perceive various 
features of sources; and are able to recognise sources as events of certain kinds or 
involving certain kinds of object.  The information extracted must be sufficient to 
explain these capacities.  Recognition processes might match representations of the 
features of sources with representations of kinds of events and objects, or they might 
simply track some characteristic pattern of frequency components produced by certain 
kinds of events and objects.  However exactly the information extraction and object 
                                                 
27 Bregman calls this ‘schema-based organisation’: it involves ‘the activation of stored knowledge of 
familiar patterns or schemas in the acoustic environment’ (Bregman, 1990, p. 397). 
28 The serial functional organisation that I am describing is an oversimplification: the results of the 
third stage may feed back to the second stage and alter or determine grouping.  For some evidence of 
top-down influences on grouping, see Bey and McAdams (2002). 
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recognition processes work, we know that they must be sufficient to explain our 
capacity to perceive and recognise the sources of sounds. 
I have described the psychological processes involved in auditory perception; 
how do these processes relate to our auditory experiences and in particular our 
experiences of sounds and auditory objects?  In virtue of their operation we 
experience both sounds and their sources.  What sounds we experience and how we 
experience them to be is determined by the way the auditory system simultaneously 
groups the frequency components it detects: the sounds we hear correspond to 
simultaneous frequency component groupings.  If the auditory system groups the 
components it detects into a single group then we experience a single sound; if it 
groups them into two groups, then we experience two sounds.  Given that the auditory 
system groups frequency components that are likely to have been produced by the 
same source, the sounds we experience normally correspond to their sources – to the 
things that produced them.   
What is true of sounds at a time is also true of sounds over time: the way we 
experience sounds as grouped is determined by the way the auditory system 
sequentially groups frequency components.  If the auditory system sequentially 
groups a sequence of frequency components then we experience the corresponding 
sounds as grouped; we experience a sequence of sounds as grouped in virtue of the 
auditory system having sequentially grouped the corresponding sets of frequency 
components.   
What sounds and auditory objects we experience is determined by the way the 
auditory system groups the frequency components it detects; we can only explain why 
the auditory system groups frequency components as it does in terms of a process that 
functions to tell us about the sources of those sounds and auditory objects; therefore, 
we can only explain why we experience the sounds and auditory objects we do in 
terms of a process that functions to tell us about their sources.29   
                                                 
29 On this view of auditory perception, sounds just are a certain pattern or structure of frequency 
components, and an experience of a sound represents a pattern or structure of frequency components 
instantiated by the soundwave that is detected by the ears.  An experience of a sound is veridical just in 
case it is produced by the pattern or structure of frequency components that would normally produce 
that experience; it is not veridical if it is not produced by any such pattern or if it is produced by a 
pattern that would not normally produce that experience.  There is not space to defend this claim in 
detail, but it’s worth noting how my view contrasts with an alternative.  According to the alternative 
sound sources produce sounds; auditory perception functions to perceive sounds; we can tell things 




V. Explaining auditory grouping 
 
The auditory system functions to represent sounds and auditory objects that 
correspond to their sources (to the objects and events that produced them) as part of a 
process that extracts information about those sources.  As a result our experience 
represents both sounds and the sources of sounds, and we normally experience sounds 
that correspond to their sources.   
This account of the function of auditory perception provides an explanation of 
our experience sounds as grouped – an explanation of why we experience auditory 
objects.  We experience sounds as grouped as the result of a process that functions to 
tell us about the sources of sounds.  Sequential grouping is a necessary step in the 
process of extracting the information about sound sources – in particular, about events 
involving them – that enables us to perceive and recognise them. 
How does this explanation in terms of function relate to the explanation in 
terms of the purely auditory principles of grouping?  To the extent that the principles 
of grouping are true generalisations about experience, the explanation in terms of the 
function tells us why those principles hold.  They hold because sounds grouped in 
accordance with the principles are likely to be grouped in a way that corresponds to 
their sources.  For example, the pitch a sound is experienced to have is determined by 
the fundamental frequency of the object vibration that produced it.30  The fundamental 
frequency of an object’s vibration is determined by the size and shape of the object.  It 
is unlikely that two identical naturally occurring objects produce sounds in the same 
period of time; therefore, a sequence of sounds all of which have the same pitch are 
likely to have been produced by a single object.  The pitch of sounds produced by an 
object can change only if, and as fast as, the object changes.  A sequence of sounds all 
of which have closely related pitches may have been produced by a single object that 
is changing in size; but two sounds with very different pitches are unlikely to have 
been produced by the same object.  Sounds grouped according to the proximity of 
their pitches will, therefore, be grouped in a way that is likely to correspond to their 
sources.  Most naturally occurring sounds have timbre determined by the complex 
                                                                                                                                            
kinds of sounds.  Given the way auditory perception actually functions, this alternative cannot be right.  
For a more detailed discussion, see Nudds (forthcoming). 
30 This is somewhat simplified, but not in a way that affects the argument. 
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spectral composition of frequency components that determine them.  The vibrations of 
two naturally occurring objects are very unlikely to have exactly the same spectral 
composition; therefore, a sequence of sounds all of which have the same spectral 
composition or timbre are very likely to have been produced by the same object and 
two sounds with different timbres are very unlikely to have been produced by the 
same object.  Sounds grouped according to their timbres will, therefore, be grouped in 
a way that is likely to correspond to their sources. 
Explanations of grouping in terms of the principles of grouping are therefore 
consistent with explanations in terms of the function of auditory perception, but 
explanations in terms of function are better explanations because they tell us why the 
principles are true.  Furthermore, although the principles of grouping may be 
consistent with explanations in terms of function, and may describe generalisations 
that are true of experience, it doesn’t follow that the auditory system uses or follows 
the principles in determining how to group frequency components.  It is unlikely that 
the auditory system groups sounds because they are similar in pitch or similar in 
timbre – it is unlikely, that is, that those sensory qualities of sounds are causally 
explanatory of grouping.  It is more plausible to suppose that the auditory system 
groups sets of frequency components because they have the same spectral 
composition, and that those sets of frequency components with the same spectral 
composition determine experiences of sounds with the same timbre.  The consequence 
of that would then be that similar sounds are grouped together, as described by the 
principles.  If that’s right, the truth of the principles of grouping is a consequence of 
the way the auditory system functions, but is not explanatory of its function. 
 
VI. What are auditory objects? 
 
The point of this account of auditory function is that it doesn’t just tell us in what 
circumstances we experience a sequence sounds as grouped, it explains why we 
experience them as grouped in those circumstances; it therefore provides the basis for 
an account of what our experience of auditory object is of, and what our experience 
represents auditory objects as being.   
I have argued that auditory experience represents both sounds and the sources 
of sounds.  How do we experience the connection between the sounds we experience 
and the sources of those sounds?  We don’t experience the source of a sound 
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independently of experiencing the sound that it produces.  When we experience a 
sound we experience it as apparently having been produced a source of a certain kind.  
For example, in experiencing the sound produced by a solid object falling onto a hard 
surface we experience a sound as apparently having been produced by a solid object 
falling onto a hard surface; in experiencing the sound made by a bird singing outside 
the window we experience a sound as apparently coming from outside.  Normally, 
when we hear a sound we hear it as having been produced by a source; in virtue of 
that we can hear the source.  That we hear sounds as produced by their sources is 
reflected in the way we describe sounds: we talk of the sound of a dropped ball and of 
a bird singing.  Describing a sound as the sound of something can be naturally 
understood to mean the sound made by or produced by that thing. 
Sounds are produced by sources: a sound has the property of having been 
produced by a source of a certain kind.  When we experience a sound as having been 
produced by a source, our experience represents it as having that non-intrinsic 
property.  Therefore, our auditory experience represents sounds and the sources of 
sounds and it represents sources as the sources of sounds by representing sounds as 
having a non-intrinsic property – the property of having been produced by a source of 
a certain kind.  We can perceive sounds as having been produced by their sources in 
virtue of our experience (veridically) representing them as having been so produced.31  
As well as offering the best explanation of our experience of sounds and their sources, 
this description is consistent with the fact that our auditory system functions to extract 
information about the objects and events that produce the soundwaves it detects.  It is 
because our auditory experience represents sounds as produced by their sources that 
we can attend to our auditory experience in the two ways that I described earlier.  
When we hear a glass bottle dropping onto the floor and bouncing our experience 
represents the sounds made by the bottle hitting the floor and bouncing, and it 
represents them as produced by an event of a certain kind.  We can attend either to the 
sounds – to how many they are, how loud they are, their pitch and rhythm – or we can 
attend to the event represented by our experience: an object bouncing on a hard 
surface. 
                                                 
31 Note that the explanation of what makes an experience of a sound veridical is different to the 
explanation of what makes an experience of the source of a sound veridical.  That means that an 
experience may veridically represent a sound, but misrepresent the source of that sound.  There are a 
number of auditory illusions that should be explained in just this way. 
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This account of our experience of sounds as produced by their sources can be 
extended to include our experience of sequences of sounds (which include continuous 
sequences not composed of discrete sounds).  The sounds that compose a sequence of 
sounds may be experienced as produced by a number of distinct sources or as 
produced by the same source.  When they are experienced as having been produced 
by the same source – as all having come from the same object – they are experienced 
as related to one another – as grouped together.  Each sound of a sequence of grouped 
sounds is experienced as having been produced by a source; they are experienced as 
grouped in virtue of being experienced as having been produced by the same source.  
We can explain, therefore, what it is to experience a sequence of sounds as grouped as 
being an experience of them as having been produced by a single source.  A sequence 
of sounds not experienced as grouped are experienced as having been produced by 
different or distinct sources. 
This claim is plausible given the account that I have given of the function of 
auditory perception.  Auditory perception functions to tell us about the sources of 
sounds; we experience sounds as grouped together as the result of a processes that 
function to extract information about their source, and so we experience them as 
grouped because they are produced by the same source (or do so if the auditory 
system is functioning normally).  In virtue of the operation of the processes that 
extract information about the source of a sequence of sounds, we have an experience 
that represents both the source of the sounds and the sequence of sounds that it 
produces.  My claim is that we hear the sequence of sounds as having been produced 
by the source we hear.  When we hear the sounds made by footsteps, for example, we 
hear them as having been produced by a single object; when we hear an object as 
bouncing we hear a sequence of sounds produced by a single object.  In both cases, 
we hear the sequence as a grouped sequence because we hear them as produced by a 
single object.  If our experience didn’t represent those sequences of sounds as having 
been produced by a single object then we wouldn’t experience footsteps as footsteps, 
or an object bouncing as an object as bouncing, we would simple experience a 
sequence of unrelated sound producing events. 
Auditory experience represents sounds as apparently produced by a source of a 
certain kind; that is, with certain properties.  For the experience to be veridical the 
sound must have actually been produced by a source of that kind.  This has the 
implication that our experience of sounds normally commits us to the existence of 
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something other than sounds.  That is surely right.  Suppose that you hear the sound of 
a drum apparently being played in middle of the room.  Your experience tells you that 
there is something happening there, that an event of a certain sort – the playing of a 
drum – is occurring.  If there is no drum there, your experience has misled you.  The 
experience wouldn’t be veridical even if we contrived – using an array of speakers, 
for example – to reproduce exactly the sounds that a drum being played there would 
make.  An experience produced in this way would be no more veridical than would be 
the visual experience of a perfect hologram of a vase on a table in front of you.  A 
visual experience produced by a perfect hologram does not represent the world as it 
really is: it represents the existence of an object – a vase – that doesn’t exist.  
Similarly, an auditory experience of a drum playing represents the existence an object; 
if there is no object being played there then your experience has misled you.  It is 
because our auditory experience of sounds commits us to the existence of objects 
other than sounds that surround-sound systems in the cinema are so effective.  Such 
systems use sounds to create the illusion of objects moving or being located around 
the listener.  When you hear such sounds it seems as if objects really are moving past 
and around you.  Knowing that the experiences are not veridical does not alter the 
effect: knowing that there are in reality no objects flying past does not prevent it 
seeming as if there are objects flying past.  That it seems that there are objects flying 
past when we know that there aren’t indicates that the illusion is perceptual and not 
the result of a judgment made on the basis of the experience.32 
The claim that auditory experience represents sounds as having been produced 
by their sources can seem puzzling if we think that perceptual experience is restricted 
in what properties it can represent to those properties that determine how things 
perceptually appear.33  Since having the property of being produced by a source of a 
certain kind is not a matter of a sound’s having a certain appearance, how does our 
experience represent it as having that property?  And since nothing other than sounds 
can auditorily appear to us, how can our auditory experience represent anything other 
                                                 
32 The illusion shows the immunity to judgment that is characteristic of the content of an experience as 
opposed to the content of judgement. 
33 There are two conceptions of appearance that are relevant here.  Something can appear F if, taking 
our experience at face value, we would judge that it is F or something can appear F if it has the sensory 
quality of F-ness.  Sometimes talk of appearance is shorthand for how someone would judge something 




than sounds?  In particular, how can it represent the objects that are the sources of 
sounds?   
If we think that perceptual experience is restricted to representing those 
properties that determine how things perceptually appear then our visual experience of 
objects can seem similarly puzzling.  We see solid objects as solid objects and not just 
as the facing surfaces of solid objects, but how can visual experience represent 
something as actually being, say, cubic – as something with a rear surface – rather 
than merely having the appearance of being cubic – as a surface with the same 
appearance as that of a cube?34  In representing something as cubic our visual 
experience represents it as having properties that go beyond the properties that 
actually determine how it appears.   
Peacocke (1993, p.169) has claimed, surely correctly, that we experience 
objects as specifically material objects: a visual experience of a boulder in front of 
you produced by a perfect hologram of a boulder does not represent the world as it 
actually is, even if the hologram is visually indistinguishable from a real boulder.  The 
content of the experience goes beyond the representation of the boulder’s appearance 
– it represents the boulder as a material object; that is, as having the properties and 
causal powers that are essential to something’s being a material object.  Peacocke 
suggests that we can explain how someone can have a perceptual representation of a 
material object by supposing that their experience serves as input to a (perhaps only 
implicitly known) theory – an intuitive mechanics – whose theorems give content to 
their concept of a material object.  Whether or not we accept the details of Peacocke’s 
account, he is certainly right about two things.  First, that visual experience represents 
objects as having properties that are not properties that determine how the object 
visually appears; and second, that an explanation of how visual experience can have 
such content will appeal to more general capacities of the subject – such as an 
intuitive understanding of mechanics – that are not perceptual capacities.  What is true 
of the content of visual experience is also true of the content of auditory experience, 
and so whatever explanation we give of how visual experience can have content that 
represents material objects will also apply to auditory experience.  The claim that 
auditory experience represents sounds as having been produced by their sources is, 
                                                 
34 Since a solid cube can be visually indistinguishable from the facing surface of a cube – a cube from 
which every part not visible from the subject’s point of view have been removed – having a rear 
surface and not being hollow are not properties that contribute to the appearance of a solid cube. 
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therefore, no more puzzling or problematic – and so no more objectionable – than the 
claim that visual experience represents objects as material objects.   
What are our experiences of auditory objects experiences of?  An auditory 
object is a sequence of sounds which are such that they are normally experienced as 
having been produced by a single source.  Normally – when the auditory system is 
functioning properly – the experience of an auditory object is the experience of a 
sequence of sounds that have been produced by a single source.  In such 
circumstances, our experience veridically represents the sounds as having been 
produced by a single source.  Some sequences of sounds, however, which are such 
that they are normally experienced as having been produced by a single source, have 
not been produced by a single source.  This is most likely to happen when the sounds 
are produced in a way that is, from the point of view of the function of the auditory 
system, abnormal.  In such circumstances the auditory system groups sounds that have 
not in fact been produced by a single source, and the resulting experience 
misrepresents those sounds as having been produced by a single source.  When this 
happens we have an experience of an auditory object that is composed of sounds that 
are not all produced by a single source, but merely seem to be. 
I began with a description of auditory grouping as it occurs in a passage of 
music, but the subsequent discussion has concerned ecological rather than musical 
sounds.  How does the account I have given of auditory grouping apply to our 
experience of grouping in music?  We perceive music in virtue of the operation of the 
same mechanisms that enable us to perceive the sources of sounds.  The auditory 
system treats the sounds produced during musical performances as if they had been 
normally produced by ecological events involving natural objects.  Our experience of 
musical sounds and of auditory objects is the result of the auditory system making the 
best ecological sense of the frequency components it detects.  In fact, such sounds are 
produced abnormally.35  The resulting experience of auditory objects – of groups of 
sounds that constitute melodies – may be of sounds that only seem to have a single 
source; but since in listening to music we adopt a ‘musical’ or ‘acousmatic’ attitude to 
the sounds, that rarely matters to us.   
                                                 
35 From the point of view of the function of the auditory system, musical sounds are produced in an 
abnormal way: naturally occurring objects and events – the kind of objects and events that the auditory 
system evolved to perceive – are very unlikely ever to produce the patterns of frequency components 
produced by groups of musical instruments playing in harmony.  The resulting experience of musical 
sounds may have little or no ecological significance. 
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Although we can explain our experience of music within the general 
framework of auditory perception that I have described, it would be a mistake to think 
of it as paradigmatic of auditory perception; it is, rather, the consequence of the 
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